OFFERS OF COMPROMISE
UNDER RULE 20.26 OF THE UNIFORM CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES - WHEN AND HOW TO MAKE AN OFFER THAT BINDS AND HOW TO ENFORCE AN ACCEPTED OFFER

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Introduction and objectives of this paper

1. This paper considers key aspects of making valid and enforceable offers of compromise pursuant to rule 20.26 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (“UCPR”) as amended which took effect on 7 June 2013. The paper also considers offers that are otherwise invalid under the UCPR but may be relied upon pursuant to the principles of Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 WLR 586, (1975) 3 All ER 333 (“Calderbank”).

2. Pursuant to s.4 and Schedule 1 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (“CPA”), Part 3-9 of the CPA and the UCPR apply to civil proceedings in the Local, District and Supreme Courts of NSW, the Dust Diseases Tribunal, the Industrial Relations Tribunal and to Class 1-4 proceedings in the Land and Environment Court.

3. Rule 20.26 of the UCPR is designed to encourage early settlement through the use of offers of compromise and costs penalties that may apply under Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR. These sections and rules are to be read as part of and guiding the discretionary power of the court to make orders as to costs (including against third parties) under s.98 of the Civil Procedure Act.

4. Costs orders are invariably final making a well drafted offer of compromise important. An order as to costs by the Supreme Court may only be appealed from with the leave of the Court of Appeal: s.101(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Leave to appeal is also required where the amount in issue is below the threshold amount of
$100,000: s.101(2)(r) of that Act. Most costs orders should (hopefully) involve less than $100,000. An appeal from the District Court to the Supreme Court of a judgment or order as to costs requires leave pursuant to s.127(2)(b) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW). Appeals from the District Court are assigned to the Court of Appeal pursuant to s.48(2)(f) of the Supreme Court Act. An appeal from the General Division of the Local Court to the Supreme Court in respect of a costs order requires leave of the Supreme Court pursuant to s.40(2)(c) of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW).

5. There must be proportionality between what is at stake on the leave application and the resources to be allocated to the appeal. A leave application involving a relatively small amount would be disproportionate to the costs of the appeal and therefore leave would be refused: McDonald v Price [2011] NSWSC 70 per Davies J at [45] citing Lord Hoffmann in Piglowski v. Pigłowski [1999] UKHL 27; [1999] 1 WLR 1360 at 1373.

**Offers of compromise and proceedings for damages under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW)**

6. The offer of compromise has limited application in claims for damages under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW) (“MACA”). Where a claim has been assessed pursuant to Division 2 of Part 4.4 of the MACA, any costs incurred in the court are assessed pursuant to s.151 of the MACA. If, however, a claim has been exempted from the CARS process pursuant to s.92 of the MACA, s.152 of the MACA applies which invokes the rules of court concerning offer of compromise and the costs payable on a party/party basis are to follow the event: see s.152(2) and (3) of the MACA. Section 153 of the MACA provides that any order of a court as to costs is to be made consistently with the relevant provisions of or made under the MACA. However, the court may make an order that departs from those provisions “in an exceptional case and for the avoidance of substantial injustice”.

7. In the decision of San v Rumble (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 259, the NSW Court of Appeal in the lead decision of Campbell JA found at [70] that s.151 is incompatible with the making of an indemnity costs order in favour of a defendant pursuant to rule 42.15 of the UCPR. The Court did, however, also state that an offer of compromise was not
irrelevant for the purposes of exercising a discretion under s.153(1) of the MACA on the basis that the offer of compromise may be taken into account in making costs orders even though the offer would not automatically attract cost consequences under rule 42.15 of the UCPR. Further, the Court considered what would constitute “an exceptional case” for the purpose of s.153 of the MACA. Having reviewed authorities from the United Kingdom and Australia relating to exceptional circumstances in criminal law and statutes which contained the word “exceptional”, the Court held that a litigant who seeks to have a court displace the costs regime under s.151 relying upon s.153 bears the onus of proving facts and presenting argument to so persuade a court. To determine whether or not it is “an exceptional case”, a court needs to find the circumstances of the instant case are unusual or out of the ordinary, whether that unusualness or being out of the ordinary arises from qualitative or quantitative factors. The case need not be one that is unique, unprecedented or very rare, and it will be necessary to approach each application by careful consideration of the facts of the individual case. Further, once an exceptional circumstance is established, it must then be established that there would be a substantial injustice if departure from the costs regime in s.151 did not occur. Lastly, the particular order that is to be made must bear in mind an objective of the MACA as defined by s.5(1)(b) which is encourage the early resolution of compensation claims”.

8. Further consideration of offers of compromise as they pertain to motor accidents claims occurred in the decision of *Arnott v Choy (No 2) [2010] NSWCA 336*. In that matter, the respondent (Choy) brought proceedings in the District Court for an assessment of damages for injury suffered in a motor vehicle accident. Choy obtained judgment in the sum of $2,154,131.60. On 2 July 2009, the appellant (Arnott) served an offer expressed in accordance with *Calderbank* of $1,754,131.60 plus costs. On appeal, the damages award was reduced to $1,134,464. The appellant was therefore successful in the Court of Appeal in obtaining a reduction in the award to a sum $619,667 less than the amount offered. The appellant then sought an order that the respondent pay costs of the appeal on the ordinary basis up to 2 July 2009 and on the indemnity basis thereafter. The respondent argued that only an offer of compromise made in accordance with the UCPR could be relied upon absent an exceptional case and to avoid a substantial injustice. The respondent also submitted that the correct application of s.152 of the MACA would
lead to an order that each party bear its own costs of the appeal and relied upon the incompleteness of the appellant’s success on appeal. The issue for determination before the Court of Appeal was whether s.152(2) which refers to “the rules of court concerning offers of compromise apply to any such offer” encompasses the making of an indemnity costs order pursuant to the principles of *Calderbank*. McColl JA and Basten JA found that nothing in s.152(2) implies the exclusion of common law principles. It was held that it would not promote the objects of the MACA, including early settlement of claims, to accept the costs consequences of offers made under the UCPR but not under *Calderbank* offers. The offer that had been made was 35% greater than the final award and reflected a genuine compromise of the appeal. It was therefore not reasonable to reject the offer and an order was made that the appellant pay the costs of the appeal on the indemnity basis from 2 July 2009.

9. The principles that may therefore be drawn from the preceding case analysis are as follows:

(a) s.151 of MACA does not prevent the Court of Appeal from making orders that an unsuccessful claimant who appeals against an award of damages to pay costs of the respondent to the appeal on the ordinary basis but the section does not permit indemnity costs orders to be made under rule 42.15 of the UCPR.

(b) The *Calderbank* offer may be relied upon as part of the “rules of court” under s.152(2) to seek an indemnity costs order in respect of a claim for motor accident damages, including in the Court of Appeal.

(c) A court may only make a costs order that departs from s.151 or 152 where the circumstances of the case are unusual or out of the ordinary and to avoid a substantial injustice and a court must bear in mind the objective of the MACA including early resolution of claims. Therefore offers of compromise and *Calderbank* offers remain relevant to the exercise of the discretion to make an order that departs from s.151 of the MACA (including an order for indemnity costs).
Division 4 of Part 20 of the UCPR – making, accepting and enforcing an offer of compromise under rule 20.26 of the UCPR

10. Rule 20.26 of the UCPR is contained within Part 20 of the UCPR which is headed “Resolution of Proceedings Without Hearing”. The application of rule 20.26 of the UCPR must be seen within the rubric of the legislative intent to resolve civil proceedings without the costs and inconvenience of a trial by using other mechanisms within Part 20. Rule 20.26 was amended by the *Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (Amendment No 59) 2013* which took effect on 7 June 2013. Offers of compromise made before 7 June 2013 are subject to the previous version of the rule: Part 1 of Schedule 12, UCPR.

11. Since 7 June 2013, rule 20.26 of the UCPR reads as follows (with emphasis for purposes of this paper):

“(1) In any proceedings, any party may, by notice in writing, make an offer to any other party to compromise any claim in the proceedings, either in whole or in part, on specified terms.

(2) An offer under this rule:

(a) must identify:

(i) the claim or part of the claim to which it relates, and

(ii) the proposed orders for disposal of the claim or part of the claim, including, if a monetary judgment is proposed, the amount of that monetary judgment, and

(b) if the offer relates only to part of a claim in the proceedings, must include a statement:

(i) in the case of an offer by the plaintiff, as to whether the balance of the proceedings is to be abandoned or pursued, or

(ii) in the case of an offer by a defendant, as to whether the balance of the proceedings will be defended or conceded, and

(c) must not include an amount for costs and must not be expressed to be inclusive of costs, and
must bear a statement to the effect that the offer is made in accordance with these rules, and

if the offeror has made or been ordered to make an interim payment to the offeree, must state whether or not the offer is in addition to that interim payment, and

must specify the period of time within which the offer is open for acceptance.

(3) An offer under this rule may propose:

(a) a judgment in favour of the defendant:

(i) with no order as to costs, or

(ii) despite subrule (2)(c), with a term of the offer that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff a specified sum in respect of the plaintiff’s costs, or

(b) that the costs as agreed or assessed up to the time the offer was made will be paid by the offeror, or

(c) that the costs as agreed or assessed on the ordinary basis or on the indemnity basis will be met out of a specified estate, notional estate or fund identified in the offer.

(4) If the offeror makes an offer before the offeree has been given such particulars of the offeror’s claim, and copies or originals of such documents available to the offeror, as are necessary to enable the offeree to fully consider the offer, the offeree may, within 14 days of receiving the offer, give notice to the offeror that:

(a) the offeree is unable to assess the reasonableness of the offer because of the lack of particulars or documents, and

(b) in the event that rule 42.14 applies to the proceedings, the offeree will seek an order of the court under rule 42.14(2).

(5) The closing date for acceptance of an offer:

(a) in the case of an offer made two months or more before the date set down for commencement of the trial - is to be no less than 28 days after the date on which the offer is made, and

(b) in any other case – is to be such date as is reasonable in the circumstances.
(8) Unless the notice of offer otherwise provides, an offer providing for the payment of money, or the doing of any other act, is taken to provide for the payment of that money, or the doing of that act, within 28 days after acceptance of the offer.

(9) An offer is taken to have been made without prejudice, unless the notice of offer otherwise provides.

(10) A party may make more than one offer in relation to the same claim.

(11) Unless the court orders otherwise, an offer may not be withdrawn during the period of acceptance for the offer.

(12) A notice of offer that purports to exclude, modify or restrict the operation of rule 42.14 or 42.15 is of no effect for the purposes of this Division.” (emphasis added)

12. Practitioners should note that the definitions in rule 20.25 of the UCPR and which apply to rule 20.26 state that “judgment in favour of the defendant includes a dismissal of a summons or a statement of claim.” As such, an offer of compromise may include a dismissal. The difficulty with making such an offer, if it is accepted, is that subject to the terms of the order a mere dismissal does not usually preclude the plaintiff from revisiting the cause of action: s.91(1) of the CPA. This is distinct from a judgment which disposes of the cause of action. As such an offer of compromise of a mere dismissal of proceedings is not recommended.

13. Where an offer of compromise under rule 20.26 of the UCPR has been made, pursuant to rule 20.27(1) of the UCPR it may be accepted “by serving written notice of acceptance on the offeror at any time” during the period for acceptance. Applying this sub-rule, oral acceptance is insufficient. Pursuant to rule 20.27(2) of the UCPR an offer may be accepted even if a further offer is made during the period of acceptance for the first offer. Where an offer is accepted under rule 20.27(1) of the UCPR, any party to the compromise may apply for judgment to be entered accordingly under rule 20.27(3) of the UCPR. That entitlement to a judgment is extant even where an obligation under an accepted offer is discharged by the offeror by payment of the sum of money equivalent to the offer. The rationale behind rule 20.27(3) of the UCPR is that it permits any party to the compromise to obtain a judgment that brings finality to the proceedings:
14. Where a party wishes to withdraw acceptance of an offer of compromise, a written notice must be served under rule 20.28(1) of the UCPR but the withdrawal of acceptance may only occur in the following circumstances:

a. pursuant to rule 20.28(1)(a) if the offer provides for payment of money, or the doing of any other act, and the sum is not paid to the offeree or into court or the act is not done within 28 days after acceptance of the offer or in such other time as the offer provides; or

b. pursuant to rule 20.28(1)(b) if the court grants leave to withdraw the acceptance. The court is unlikely to grant leave unless there is good reason for a party to retract acceptance as it is an agreement. An applicant would need to establish a basis such as duress, fraud, non est factum or mistake (whether unilateral or bilateral) such that the free will to form the agreement is overborne or otherwise vitiated.

15. Where a party has accepted an offer and the other party to the offer fails to comply with that offer, the defendant as innocent party may apply to the court for judgment or order as is appropriate to give effect to the terms of the accepted offer or for an order the proceedings be dismissed and judgment entered accordingly pursuant to rule 20.29(1)(a) or (b) of the UCPR. The plaintiff as an innocent party to such an offer may apply to the court for a judgment or order as is appropriate to give effect to the terms of the accepted offer or for an order the defence be struck out and judgment entered accordingly pursuant to rule 20.29(2)(a) or (b) of the UCPR.

16. Where proceedings are the subject of an appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal, Division 8 of Part 51 of the UCPR makes provision for offers of compromise. Rule 51.47(1) permits a party to an appeal to make an offer of compromise while rule 51.47(2) provides that the provisions of Division 4 of Part 20 as to compromise apply to any such offer subject to references to such things as court, proceeding, plaintiff and
defendant are to be taken to the necessary equivalent titles in the appeal proceedings. Rule 51.48 similarly modifies the operation of Division 3 of Part 42 as to costs flowing from offers of compromise to apply to the appeal proceedings. Any offer of compromise made in the court below may be regarded by the Court of Appeal pursuant to rule 51.49 of the UCPR in the exercise of the discretion as to costs.

Controversies involving the former rule 20.26(2) of the UCPR and Whitney v Dream Developments Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 311

17. The most significant difference in the offer of compromise that existed before 7 June 2013 was the former sub-rule 20.26(2) of the UCPR, which stated as follows: “An offer must be exclusive of costs, except where it states that it is a verdict for the defendant and that the parties are to bear their own costs.” Two immediate problems arose with the former sub-rule 20.26(2). The first was that the use of the word “verdict” for the defendant was erroneous. A verdict is the finding of a jury as to a question of fact put to them for deliberation and determination in civil or criminal law. The determination of the rights of the parties by a court gives rise to a “judgment” or orders, which are determinative of the dispute. Section 90(1) of the CPA provides that at, or after trial, a court is to give “such judgment or make such order as the nature of the case requires”. This section is supported by rule 36.1 of the UCPR that permits a court at any stage of the proceedings to give such judgment or make such orders as the nature of the case requires. Similarly, s.81 of the District Court Act states that a “judgment in an action shall” be “final and conclusive between the parties to the action”. The offer that should have been identified in the former sub-rule 20.26(2) of the former UCPR was “judgment” for the defendant, not a “verdict”.

18. The second problem with the former rule 20.26(2) of the UCPR was the use of the words “must be exclusive of costs”. These words gave rise to a great deal of confusion amongst practitioners of both the Bar and the solicitors’ branch of the profession as well as conflicting judgments as to validity of offers. This confusion was not resolved until the NSW Court of Appeal comprised of five Justices delivered the decision of Whitney v Dream Developments Pty Ltd (2013) 84 NSWLR 311 (“Whitney”). The Court consisting of Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, McColl JA, Barrett JA and Emmett JA held,
that an offer of compromise for the payment of a particular sum which included a statement “the defendant to pay the plaintiff’s costs as agreed or assessed” invalidated the offer of compromise. The reasons of Bathurst CJ at [25] and Barrett JA at [52] were, in summary, that the contentious statement had the effect of fettering the discretion under Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR, thereby not abiding by the costs regime of that Division. Beazley P and McColl JA agreed with reasons of Bathurst CJ and Barrett JA.

19. In a separate judgment by Emmett JA that was not the subject of agreement by the plurality, it was noted at [75] that the making of an offer under which the defendant was to pay the plaintiff’s costs as agreed or assessed “would involve departure from the scheme contemplated under rule 42, since it would the oust the residual power of the court…”.

20. The *ratio decidendi* of the Court in *Whitney*, although slightly differently expressed by each Justice, was that any offer of compromise that added an agreement as to costs would be invalid as it was seeking to create a binding agreement that excluded the jurisdiction of the courts to deal with costs under Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR.

21. It is to be noted that the decision in *Whitney* post-dated the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in *Barrakat and Ors v Bazdarova* [2012] NSWCA 140 in which an offer had been made of a judgment in favour of the offeree in the sum of $225,000 “excluding legal costs of the appeal plus costs of the trial on the ordinary basis”. The use of the words “excluding legal costs of the appeal plus costs of the trial on the ordinary basis” did not invalidate the offer. Notably, the Court in that matter consisted of Chief Justice Bathurst, Justice of Appeal Whealy and Acting Justice of Appeal Tobias.

**Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR: the costs regime to be applied following the making of an offer of compromise**

22. Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR contains the costs rules to be applied in respect of offers of compromise that are accepted or rejected. This Division was amended on 7 June 2013 by Amendment Number 59. As with the former rule 20.26 of the UCPR, the
former Division 3 of Part 42 Rules apply to offers made before 7 June 2013: see UCPR Sch 12, Pt 1.

23. In summary the rules dealing with offers of compromise under rule 20.26 of the UCPR are as follows (with emphasis for ease of reference):

a. Rule 42.13A: *Where an offer of compromise with no provision as to costs is accepted*, if the offer proposed a judgment in the plaintiff’s favour the plaintiff is entitled to a costs order against the defendant assessed on the ordinary basis up to the time when the offer is made. If the offer proposed a judgment for the defendant (including a dismissal), the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant’s costs in respect of the claim assessed on the ordinary basis up to the time when the offer was made. This rule is automatic and is not subject to a discretion.

b. Rule 42.14: *Where an offer of compromise is made by the plaintiff but is not accepted and the order or judgment on the claim is no less favourable to the plaintiff*, pursuant to rule 42.14(2)(a) “[U]nless the court orders otherwise” the plaintiff is entitled to an order against the defendant for the plaintiff’s costs in respect of the claim on the ordinary basis to a point in time at which the order is then on the indemnity basis. When the indemnity basis commences depends on when the day on which the offer was made. Pursuant to rule 42.14(2)(b)(i) if the offer was made before the first day of the trial, the indemnity basis is from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made. Pursuant to rule 42.14(2)(b)(ii) if the offer was made on or after the first day of the trial, the indemnity basis is from 11.00am on the day following the day on which the offer was made. [Note: consistent with Whitney the broad discretion of the court under s.98 of the Civil Procedure Act is not displaced by the rule given the introductory words of rule 42.14(2) “Unless the court orders otherwise…”].

c. Rule 42.15 – *Where an offer of compromise is made by the defendant but not accepted by the plaintiff and the plaintiff obtains an order or judgment no more
favourable to the plaintiff than the terms of the offer, pursuant to rule 42.15(2)(a) “[U]nless the court orders otherwise” the plaintiff is entitled to an order against the defendant for costs on an ordinary basis up to the time the defendant becomes entitled to costs on an indemnity basis. Pursuant to rule 42.15(2)(b)(i) where the offer was made before the first day of the trial the defendant is entitled to costs on an indemnity basis from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made. Pursuant to rule 42.15(2)(b)(ii) where the offer was made on or after the first day of the trial the defendant is entitled to indemnity costs from 11.00am on the day following the day on which the offer was made. [Note again the broad discretion of the court is not displaced given the introductory words “Unless the court orders otherwise…”].

d. Rule 42.15A – Where an offer of compromise is made by the defendant but is not accepted and the defendant obtains an order or judgment no less favourable to the defendant than the offer, pursuant to rule 42.15A(2)(a) “[U]nless the court orders otherwise” the defendant is entitled to an order against the plaintiff for the defendant’s costs on an ordinary basis up to the time which the defendant becomes entitled to indemnity costs. Pursuant to rule 42.15A(2)(b)(i) where the offer was made before the first day of the trial, the indemnity is from the beginning of the day following the day on which the offer was made. Pursuant to rule 42.15A(2)(b)(ii) where the offer was made on or after the first day of the trial, the indemnity is from 11.00am on the day following the day on which the offer was made. [Note the discretion of the court is not displaced given the introductory words “Unless the court orders otherwise…”].

24. Rule 42.15A of the UCPR may be relied on where a defendant makes an offer of compromise of a judgment for the defendant under rule 20.26 of the UCPR with or without a sum for costs and that offer is not accepted but the defendant obtains a judgment and an ordinary costs order in its favour. In the decision of *JJES Pty Ltd v Sayan (No 2)* [2014] NSWSC 975 (4 July 2014) per Campbell J, the defendant had made an offer on 2 February 2012 under the former rule 20.26(2) of the UCPR of a judgment for the defendant with each party to pay its own costs and disbursements. At the date of the offer the defendant had incurred costs and disbursements of $30,000.
The plaintiff did not accept the offer and judgment was entered for the defendant on 8 May 2014. The proceedings concerned a franchise for a 7-Eleven convenience store. The plaintiff corporation was a “man of straw” incorporated solely for the franchise, was without assets and had a sole director and shareholder, a Mrs Navaei. Mrs Navaei was the main witness on liability and damages and her evidence was rejected. Campbell J found the defendant was prima facie entitled to the benefit of rule 42.15A of the UCPR and receive the benefit of costs paid on the ordinary basis to 2 February 2012 and thereafter on the indemnity basis. Further as the plaintiff was a man of straw and Mrs Navaei had directed and had an interest in the litigation an order was made under s.98(1) of the Civil Procedure Act that Mrs Navaei pay the defendant’s costs in substitution for the plaintiff corporation. In making a third party costs order, Campbell J relied on and referred to the ratio decidendi of the High Court in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 192-3 per Mason CJ and Deane J (Gaudron J agreeing) as to the category of cases where such orders may be made as follows:

“That category of case consists of circumstances where the party to the litigation is an insolvent person or man of straw, where the non-party has played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and where the non-party, or some person on whose behalf he or she is acting, or by whom he or she has been appointed, has an interest in the subject of the litigation. Where the circumstances of a case fall within that category, an order for costs should be made against the non-party if the interests of justice require that it be made.”

25. By use of the word “entitled”, rules 42.14-42.15A of the UCPR create in effect a right to a special costs order in favour of the successful offeror by way of the indemnity from the day after the offer was made: Hillier v Sheather (1995) 36 NSWLR 414. However, the right to the indemnity contained in rules 42.14-42.15A is qualified by the words “Unless the court orders otherwise”. The question that arises in the exercise of the discretion to order “otherwise” is whether the offeree has any basis for denying the successful offeror’s entitlement under the rules to an indemnity costs order: Marsland v Andjelic (No 2) (1993) 32 NSWLR 649. That question is approached on the basis that sufficient circumstances will generally be required to justify a departure from the rule: Morgan v Johnson (1998) 48 NSWLR 578 at 581-582 per Mason J. This is an impressionistic exercise and will depend on all the facts of the matter as well as the
conduct of the successful offeror in the course of the proceedings. Factors justifying the refusal of an indemnity under rules 42.14-42.15A of the UCPR include the following:

a. Where an offeror betters an offer but significantly changed the case after the date of the offer. An example is where a plaintiff succeeded at trial on a new point only advanced in final submissions: *Nominal Defendant v Hawkins* (2011) 58 MVR 362.

b. Where the costs incurred are wholly disproportionate to the judgment amount and the proceedings were pursued for an extraneous purpose: *Jones v Sutton (No 2)* [2005] NSWCA 203.

c. Where the costs are attributable to the offeror’s own unreasonable conduct. As an example costs may be refused on the indemnity basis where an offeror unreasonably contested an issue on which the offeror did not succeed: *EDPI Pty Ltd v Rapdoeks Pty Ltd* [2007] NSWSC 195.

26. The general discretion of the court contained within rules 42.14-42.15A of the UCPR is also subject to the overriding principle in s.60 of the CPA that in any proceedings, the practice and the procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in a way that the costs to the parties are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute. As such, a significant disproportion between the judgment amount and the cost of the proceedings may justify depriving an otherwise successful offeror of the usual costs order, including an award of indemnity costs that would otherwise flow from an accepted offer of compromise: *Jones v Sutton (No 2)*. Lastly, despite the entitlement to the indemnity under rules 42.14-42.15A of the UCPR it is to be recalled that these rules are subordinate legislation. The UCPR are always subordinate to the provisions of the *Civil Procedure Act* including the discretion as to costs in s.98 of that Act. As stated by Davies J in *McDonald v Price* at [18]:

“[I]t is a well known principle that a power provided by the Rules cannot exceed the power given in an Act under which those Rules are made, and if the Rule and the Act are irreconcilable then the Rule must give
27. On the basis of the use of the words “Unless the court otherwise orders”, the NSW Court of Appeal in Whitney found that the requirement that an offer be “exclusive of costs” in the former rule 20.26(2) was to ensure that offers did not remove the residual discretion of a court under Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR, in particular to depart from the entitlement to an indemnity order. It was held by Barrett JA at [52] in Whitney that it was an essential characteristic of any offer of compromise that it must abide by the regime with respect to costs under Division 3 of Part 42 and that the words “exclusive of costs” were part of this essential characteristic. As stated by Barrett JA, that essential characteristic had to be left “untrammelled by any apparent contractual qualification, supplement or contradiction.” The words “costs as agreed or assessed” were an offer to enter a binding agreement to pay costs, such agreement precluding the discretion the court may otherwise have to disallow costs or make orders contrary to the agreement.

Application of the amended rule 20.26(3) of the UCPR – an offer that includes costs can be made by a defendant only

28. The difficulty with the former rule 20.26(2) as identified in Whitney was that a reference to costs invalidated the offer of compromise. This difficulty was overcome in part by the new rule 20.26(3)(b) operative from 7 June 2013. I say “in part” as a plaintiff still cannot make a valid offer that contains a reference to costs.

29. Rule 20.26(3)(b) of the UCPR provides that an offer may propose that the costs as agreed or assessed up to the time the offer was made will be paid by the offeror. An offer of costs as agreed or assessed under rule 20.26(3)(b) of the UCPR should only flow from a defendant to a plaintiff. A plaintiff cannot (or hopefully will not) make an offer that costs as agreed or assessed will be paid “by the offeror” under rule 20.26(3)(b) of the UCPR. If accepted, this would leave the plaintiff liable to pay the defendant’s costs. Rule 20.26(3)(b) does mean, however, that arguably an offer by a defendant to pay a sum or to enter orders for part or all of a plaintiff’s claim may also include an
offer to pay the plaintiff’s costs as agreed or assessed up until the time the offer was made. Similarly, rule 20.26(3)(c) of the UCPR arguably permits a defendant trustee to make an offer to pay costs as agreed or assessed on the ordinary or indemnity basis from a specified estate, notional estate or fund for example as part of an offer to settle part or all of a plaintiff’s claim under Chapter 3 of the *Succession Act 2006* (NSW).

30. Pursuant to rule 20.26(2) and (3) of the UCPR, a plaintiff can only make an offer of compromise that does not include costs and is not expressed to be inclusive of costs. Costs of the plaintiff as offeror are to be dealt with under rules 42.13A, 42.14 or 42.15 of the UCPR. If a plaintiff makes an offer that includes a provision for costs this would still be invalid under *Whitney* as the offer would fetter the discretion of the court under Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR and is not authorised by rule 20.26(2), (3)(b) or (3)(c).

31. Rule 20.26(3)(b) does not permit an offer of compromise to be made by a defendant of a payment of a sum for part or all of a claim plus a specified sum for costs. Rule 20.26(3)(b) does not permit a defendant to make an offer of payment of a sum for part or all of a claim with such sum to be inclusive of costs. An offer by a defendant of a payment of a “specified sum in respect of the plaintiff’s costs” can only be made as part of an offer of compromise of a judgment for the defendant plus a specified sum for costs pursuant to rule 20.26(3)(a)(ii) of the UCPR.

32. The words “verdict in favour of the defendant” are no longer valid for the purposes of rule 20.26(3)(a) of the UCPR. The words that must be used are a “judgment in favour of the defendant”. If such an offer is made, costs are either dealt with on the basis that there would be no order as to costs under rule 20.26(3)(a)(i) or that the defendant will pay to the plaintiff a specified sum in respect of the plaintiff’s costs under rule 20.26(3)(a)(ii). Rule 20.26(3)(a)(ii) is clearly designed to enable an offer of a judgment for the defendant to be more attractive to a plaintiff who has incurred costs. The former offer under rule 20.26(2) of a “verdict for the defendant with each party to bear their own costs” had very little bait on the hook to make it appetising to a plaintiff unless the claim was manifestly hopeless even to the most bellicose litigant.
What is a compromise and when should a compromise be offered?

33. The question then becomes: what is a compromise? Under rule 20.26 of the UCPR and the general law, an offer must involve “a real and genuine element of compromise”: *Hearing v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2)* [2005] NSWCA 375 at [5]; *Dean v Stockland Property Management Pty Ltd (No 2)* [2010] NSWCA 141 at [14]; *Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2)* [2011] NSWCA 344 at [9]. This definition has been described “serviceable” (but not “entirely apposite”) and requires an objective assessment of the value of the claim of the offeree versus the value of the offer: *Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2)* at [9]. To be a “real and genuine” offer the offeror must be giving something away and the offer must not be merely derisory or involve capitulation where prospects of the offeree were more than “slight”: *Miwa Pty Ltd v Siantan Properties Pte Ltd (No 2)* at [19]; *Barakat and Ors v Bazdarova* at [51](e)-(f).

34. An offer of a “verdict for the defendant” (which amounts to capitulation) may only be a genuine compromise when the claim is approaching something of the character of frivolous or vexatious: *Leach v Nominal Defendant (QBE) Insurance Australia Ltd (No 2)* [2014] NSWCA 391 at [51]. Determining what constitutes a genuine compromise requires a factual and impressionistic enquiry taking into account the monetary value of the claim, the facts supporting the claim and any elements of the claim additional to the monetary value: *Shellharbour City Council v Johnson (No 2)* (2006) 67 NSWLR 208 at [20]-[23].

35. If a plaintiff’s offer is in substance merely a demand for payment of the full amount claimed or a formal offer “designed simply to trigger the entitlement to indemnity costs” then wholly exceptional circumstances are required to justify an indemnity costs order: *Tickell v Trifleska Pty Ltd* (1990) 25 NSWLR 353 at 355. Even though rule 20.26(3) of the UCPR contemplate an offer of a judgment in favour of the defendant with no order as to costs, a defendant’s offer to bear its own costs or contribute only a trivial proportion of the claim may lack the element of compromise necessary to comply with rule 20.26 and invoke the costs provisions of Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR:
*Leichhardt Municipal Council v Green* [2004] NSWCA 341 at [30]; *Hearing v GWS Machinery Pty Ltd (No 2)* at [5] citing *Townsend v Townsend* [2001] NSWCA 145 at [5] per Giles JA. I submit that the cases support a proposition that an offer of compromise of a judgment for the defendant with no order as to costs will be a genuine compromise where the facts and law suggest the plaintiff’s claim (or appeal) is wholly unmeritorious and a capitulation is required to avoid an adverse costs order. This analysis is supported by in *Hart Security Australia Pty Ltd v Boucousis and Others (No 2)* [2014] NSWSC 1815 (18 December 2014) per Darke J. In that matter the court refused to make an order for indemnity costs despite the defendant bettering the offer. In that matter, the court ordered an Amended Statement of Claim be dismissed with costs. The defendants as offeror sought an order for indemnity costs based on an offer that had been made on 6 June 2014 to pay $30,000 to the plaintiff and pay the plaintiff’s costs as agreed or assessed up to the date of the offer. Applying Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR, *prima facie* the defendants were entitled to indemnity costs after the date of the offer. It was noted by Darke J at [11] that the offer was tantamount to a surrender on the part of the plaintiff in circumstances where the plaintiff was advancing a case that was “by no means hopeless, frivolous or vexatious” and that as a consequence it was “not an offer of a kind likely to encourage early settlement”: *Hart Security* at [12]. The fact such an offer is a genuine compromise may be proved by the covering letter referring to the poor prospects of the claim and to costs incurred by the defendant to date.

36. The next question is when the offer should be made. An offer of compromise under the UCPR cannot be made prior to proceedings commencing. This is because rule 20.26(1) refers to an offer being made “in any proceedings”. Until such time as an originating process is filed, whether by way of a summons or statement of claim, there is no proceeding in which an offer may be made under the UCPR. When an offer of compromise should be made in the course of proceedings is an impressionistic determination. Where an offer is made before particulars of the offeror’s claim are available, it is essential that the offeree provide notice within 14 days under rule 20.26(4) of the UCPR that the offer is unable to be assessed due to lack of particulars.
For a plaintiff the best time to make an offer of compromise is after there are sufficient particulars of a claim for the offeree to be able to assess the offer. A plaintiff may have provided extensive evidence of a claim prior to commencing proceedings to enable an offer of compromise to be served contemporaneous with the service of an originating process. In the alternative, the best time may only arise at any one of the following stages: answering of a request for further and better particulars; the service of a filed defence; the exchange of documents pursuant to discovery; the exchange of evidence; or shortly before or even in the midst of a trial. There is nothing in the rules preventing the making of multiple offers of compromise if the offers are a genuine compromise.

It should also be noted that offers of compromise may be served in proceedings in the NSW Court of Appeal (as modified by rule 51.47 of the UCPR). A further offer of compromise in the appeal is recommended if a party wants to protect its position on the appeal proceedings. Again, for an offer to be a “genuine” compromise there must be an element of giving something up to the offeree. This may involve a payment of damages above those awarded in a primary judgment but less than those claimed on appeal. It may also be an offer of a “judgment for the respondent” (which includes a dismissal of the appeal) where the appeal is unmeritorious. The best time to make an offer of compromise on appeal proceedings is potentially after both a Notice of Appeal and submissions have been filed and served by the appellant to permit the offeree to consider the strengths (or weaknesses) of the appeal and whether it should be resolved without argument.

Invalid offers of compromise and reliance in the alternative on Calderbank

The invalid offer may be rescued pursuant to the principles of Calderbank. This is not, however, automatic as the circumstances of the offer, or the offer itself, must be such as to clearly invoke an understanding on the part of the offeree that the offer may be relied upon to depart from the usual rule that costs are to be granted in favour of the successful party payable on the ordinary basis. This requires an analysis of the entirety of the circumstances of the case to determine whether or not the offer would be applicable for the purposes of Calderbank: Whitney per Bathurst CJ at [42]-[43] and
Barrett JA at [57]. This is based on an evaluation of the nature of the communication and this evaluation is both objective and impressionistic.

40. The best way to enable reliance on Calderbank in respect of an invalid offer of compromise is to ensure that any letter serving the offer of compromise under rule 20.26 of UCPR includes a statement that the offer of compromise is relied upon for the purposes of Calderbank (with a full citation of that case) in the event that the offer of compromise is invalid for any reason. Further, the letter of service should be marked “without prejudice save as to costs” consistent with Calderbank. As a final step, if the practitioner thinks it is warranted, the reasons why it would be unreasonable not to accept the offer should be provided by reference to both law and the evidence served by the parties or exchanged in discovery.

41. If a valid offer of compromise under rule 20.26 of the UCPR is served but not accepted, then the right to an indemnity costs order under rules 42.14-42.15A arises unless the court “orders otherwise”. This right is identified by the verb “entitled”. This right is substantially different to the position under Calderbank. A Calderbank offer does not automatically result in a court making a favourable costs order: SMEC Services Pty Ltd v Campbelltown City Council [2000] NSWCA 323; see also the summary of authorities for this proposition in Trustee for Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust & Anor v Becker & Anor (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 194 per Ipp JA at [7]. A favourable costs order under Calderbank will only arise when, in all the circumstances, a court in its discretion under s.98 of the Civil Procedure Act finds that there is justification for departure from the ordinary rule as to costs.

42. The NSW Court of Appeal in Evans Shire Council v Richardson [2006] NSWCA 61 held that there is an onus on the offeror to establish it was unreasonable for the offeree to refuse the Calderbank offer. This has been confirmed in the authorities cited by Ipp JA in Trustee for Salvation Army (NSW) Property Trust & Anor v Becker & Anor (No 2) (ibid). This statement of the onus is effectively a reversal of the position under Division 3 of Part 42 of the UCPR where the rules govern the entitlement to costs “[U]nless the court orders otherwise”. In summary, under Calderbank the offeror must establish why the court should exercise the discretion in the offeror’s favour for an
indemnity costs order whereas under the UCPR the onus is on the offeree to establish why the court should not apply the rules and order indemnity costs. The enquiry required by reliance on a Calderbank offer may create a mini trial regarding the circumstances at the time the offer was made and whether it was unreasonable to reject the offer. Examples of where rejection of an offer was not unreasonable include the following:

a. Where a party succeeded at trial on a case that significantly changed after the offer was made: *Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd* (2001) 53 NSWLR 626.

b. Where the offer was open for a very short period of time of 5 days and was conditional on the provision of a release in of claims in unrelated proceedings: *Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd* [2006] NSWSC 583 at [73]-[74].

c. Where the offer was ambiguous as to its terms: *Lahoud v Lahoud* [2011] NSWSC 1186.

d. Where no pre-judgment interest was provided in the offer despite the explanatory letter and terms of the offer referring to such interest with the result that the offer thereby implicitly excluded interest: *Coregas Pty Ltd v Penford Australia Pty Ltd (No 2)* [2013] NSWCA 11 at [12] per Hoeben JA, Meagher JA and Bergin CJ in Eq agreeing.

43. There are also questions that arise under Calderbank as to whether or not an offer constituted a genuine compromise as with the UCPR. Again, this all depends on the circumstances of the case. The test is whether or not the offer has been made in a “genuine attempt to reach a negotiated settlement”.
Offers of compromise and administrative law proceedings arising from MACA

44. I shall now provide a brief review of *AAI Limited v Josipovic (No 2)* [2013] NSWSC 1577 (1 November 2013) per Campbell J (“AAI Limited”).

45. In the decision of *AAI Limited*, the substantive proceedings were brought by an insurer challenging the validity of a certificate issued under s.94(4) of MACA. That certificate was by a claims assessor of the Claims Assessment and Resolution Service in respect of damages for personal injury suffered by the first defendant in a motor vehicle accident. The claims assessor’s certificate and supporting decision assessed damages at $118,633.60 plus costs and disbursements, which were allowed in the sum of $28,564.08. The total of these figures for damages and costs was $147,197.68. The plaintiff’s claims for relief in the Supreme Court were in the nature of *certiorari* setting aside the claims assessor’s certificate and *mandamus* remitting the first defendant’s application for re-assessment of damages according to law. The complaint of the plaintiff was an error of law in the assessment by the claims assessor of damages, particularly for future care with that head of damages totalling $75,996.60.

46. The plaintiff was unsuccessful in the Supreme Court and as a consequence the claims assessor’s original certificate with supporting decision and assessment of damages and allowance of costs totalling $147,197.68 remained valid and binding on the plaintiff insurer under s.95 of the MACA. Campbell J at first instance made orders dismissing the Supreme Court proceedings and that the plaintiff pay the first defendant’s costs of the proceedings as agreed or assessed. Pursuant to rule 42.2 of the UCPR in the absence of a contrary order this meant the first defendant’s costs were to be assessed on the ordinary basis.

47. The first defendant, being the injured claimant, had made an offer of compromise pursuant to rule 20.26 of the UCPR on 20 August 2013 of a judgment entered against the plaintiff in favour of the first defendant in the sum of $125,000 plus costs as agreed or assessed. As the total assessment by the claims assessor the subject of the Supreme Court proceedings was $147,197.68, the offer was a compromise of $22,197.68 ($147,197.68 - $125,000 = $22,197.68). No provision was made in the offer of
compromise for orders to set aside or otherwise dispose of the claims assessor’s certificate the subject of the proceedings.

48. The first defendant sought an order for costs on the indemnity basis from 21 August 2013 pursuant to rule 42.15A of the UCPR and on the basis that the order or judgment was no less favourable to her than the terms of the offer. The two issues for determination of the application for indemnity costs were:

   a. whether an offer in the Supreme Court’s administrative law jurisdiction engages rule 20.26 of the UCPR; and

   b. whether the order dismissing the proceeding was an order on the claim no less favourable to the first defendant than the terms of the offer.

49. The plaintiff argued that an offer to accept a discount on the damages and costs awarded by the assessor was not an offer to compromise any claim in the proceedings before the Supreme Court. The plaintiff submitted that the proceedings consisted only of a challenge to the legality of the claims assessor’s decision on the basis the decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error, or error on the face of the record consisting of legal error, in assessing the allowance for future care. Relying upon the decision of Brennan J in Attorney General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35-6 [17], the plaintiff submitted that the duty and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in administrative review does not go beyond a declaration and enforcement of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. As the offer of compromise was couched in the terms of a payment of damages, it did not deal with the relief in the proceedings.

50. This submission was rejected by Campbell J in AAI Limited at [23] where it was noted the judicature is but one of the three co-ordinate branches of government and the Supreme Court was able to determine the dispute which required a reduction of the damages awarded by the claims assessor. In this context it was appropriate to bear in mind that the purpose of the rules relating to offers of compromise include the encouragement of “the proper compromise of litigation, in the private interests of
individual litigants and the public interest of the prompt and economical disposal of the litigation”.

51. As the fundamental dispute was not about the legality of the claims assessor’s decision but the amount of damages payable as found by the claims assessor, it was valid that the first defendant should make an offer of compromise for a reduced assessment of damages and notwithstanding the fact that the offer of compromise was made in the context of Supreme Court proceedings for administrative law relief in the supervisory jurisdiction. This conclusion disposed of the first issue.

52. With respect to the second issue, Campbell J held in *AAI Limited* at [32] and [33] that it was necessary for a defendant to a claim by an insurer for administrative review of an assessment of damages to identify not only that the decision the subject of review be set aside, but that a judgment be entered in favour of the plaintiff insurer in a lesser amount. As such, it is valid to make an offer to accept a lesser sum of damages that complies with rule 20.26 of the UCPR but only if the defendant identifies both the order proposed to dispose of the claim for judicial review and the amount of monetary judgment proposed for damages. The basis for this conclusion is that rule 20.26(2)(a)(ii) of the UCPR provides that an offer “must identify ... the proposed orders for disposal of the claim” to which it relates.

53. The subject offer of compromise did not propose orders disposing of the proceedings by way of an order setting aside the claims assessor’s certificate. Such an order was necessary because pursuant to s.95(2) of the MACA the amount of damages the subject of the certificate was binding on the plaintiff as insurer and the plaintiff as insurer was obliged to pay to the claimant the amount of damages specified in the certificate. Unless that certificate was set aside, a binding determination was in place and notwithstanding any acceptance of the offer of compromise.

54. Due to the fact that the offer did not provide for orders to set aside the certificate, the offer was held by Campbell J to be invalid pursuant to the principles of *Whitney* because, as stated by Bathurst CJ in *Whitney* at [40], an offer will not engage r 42.15A of the UCPR if it is “not one compliant with rule 20.26”. Campbell J declined to make
an order for indemnity costs and ordered that each party bear their own costs of the application for indemnity costs, such that the original order for ordinary costs stood.

55. *AAI Ltd* was considered and applied in *QBE Insurance (Australia) Ltd v Volokhova (No 2) [2014] NSWSC 779* per Harrison AsJ to order the plaintiff pay costs of a claimant on the indemnity basis. The first defendant had made an offer that compromised not only the sum of damages but also proposed an order that “the certificate and reasons of” the Motor Accidents Authority of NSW made on 2 August 2013 “be set aside”. This offer disposed of the claim (being judicial review of a claims assessment determination) and therefore the offer “did not suffer the same vice” as the offer of compromise in *AAI Limited*.

**Conclusion**

56. Rule 20.26 has been a very contentious rule within the UCPR. Care needs to be taken in drafting such offers to obtain a costs order that meets the client’s interests. An invalid offer of compromise may leave a client with an unsatisfactory costs order and with little chance for leave to appeal being granted in order to rectify it.

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